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In 2000, I published An End to Insanity: Recasting the Role of Mental
Disability in Criminal Cases,' which in a revised version became a chapter in
my book, Minding Justice.2 The principal argument advanced in the article
and chapter is that the special excuse for people with mental disability known
as the insanity defense should be reconsidered now that modem criminal law,
in particular the Model Penal Code (MPC), has subjectivized affirmative
defenses such as self-defense and duress for people who are not mentally ill.3
My claim is that these latter defenses capture the universe of people who should
be excused due to mental illness. That position, if accepted, means that people
with mental illness could be integrated into the culpability framework that
applies to people who are not mentally ill and need no longer be handled
through an independent excuse doctrine.4
Reaction to this "Integrationist Test" has been voluble. Some have found
the idea attractive.5 Others have not. Richard Bonnie, one of the progenitors of
* Christopher Slobogin, Milton Underwood Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School.
This Article is based upon a talk given at the 2009 Criminal Law Symposium: Excuses andthe CriminalLaw,
held at Texas Tech University School of Law on April 3, 2009. For their feedback on the ideas expressed in
this Article, the author would like to thank his fellow symposium participants, especially Michael Corrado,
Deborah Denno, Arnold Loewy, and Paul Robinson, as well as participants at a brown bag at Vanderbilt
University Law School.
1. Christopher Slobogin, An End to Insanity: Recasting the Role of Mental Disability in Criminal
Cases, 86 VA. L. REV. 1199 (2000) [hereinafter Slobogin, AN END TO INSANITY].
2. CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, MINDING JUSTICE: LAWS THAT DEPRIVE PEOPLE WITH MENTAL
DISABILITY OF LIFE AND LIBERTY 23-61 (Harvard University Press 2006) [hereinafter SLOBOGIN, MINDING
JUSTICE].
3. See id. at 51-58.
4. See id. at 60-61.
5. See Arnold Loewy, The Two Faces ofInsanity, 42 TEX. TECH L. REV. 515 (2009) (arguing for a
similar approach); Tom Lyons, No Different Standard for Crimes of Delusion, SARASOTA HERALD-TRiB.,
May 14, 2009, at BNI (endorsing the integrationist approach).
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the current federal insanity test, has called the Integrationist Test "arbitrary."6
Stephen Morse and Morris Hoffman have said it is "neither more just nor more
workable than a properly circumscribed defense of insanity."7 Several others,
including some of the professors featured in this Symposium book, have
suggested the Integrationist Test fails to exculpate all of those who should be
exculpated. I am gratified that so many people have seen fit to examine the
proposal. This Article aims to defend it.
I. THE OVERBREADTH OF CURRENT TESTS
The defense of the Integrationist Test starts with a criticism of current tests
for insanity, which come in three main variants: (1) inability-to-control,
(2) inability-to-appreciate, and (3) irrationality.9 All of these tests, if applied
honestly, excuse people "we" (meaning the vast majority of the populace) do
not want to excuse. Because this argument was laid out in detail in the above-
referenced works, it will only be briefly described here.' 0
The inability-to-control test, sometimes called the irresistible impulse test
or the volitional prong of the insanity test, excuses people who, by reason of
mental illness, lacked substantial capacity to conform their behavior to the
requirements of the law at the time of the crime.1 Honestly applied, this
formulation excuses sex offenders with paraphilia (individuals who have
extremely strong urges). 12 Yet virtually no one this side of John Gacy and
Jeffrey Dahmer thinks these people should have an excuse. 13 Also operating
6. Richard J. Bonnie, Why "Appreciation of Wrongfulness" Is the Morally Preferable Standard for the
Insanity Defense, presentation at Conference on the Affirmative Defense of Insanity in Texas 59 (Feb. 7,
2003), available at www.txpsych.org.
7. Stephen J. Morse & Morris B. Hoffman, The Uneasy Entente Between Legal Insanity and Mens
Rea: Beyond Clark v. Arizona, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1071, 1131 (2007).
8. Michael Corrado, The Case for a Purely Volitional Insanity Defense, 42 TEx. TECH. L. REV. 483
(2009); Susan Rozelle, Pure Insanity, 42 TEX. TECH L. REV. 543 (2009). Although Brian Shannon's paper,
which he described at the symposium, does not directly address the Integrationist Test, his endorsement of a
volitional prong for the insanity defense suggests that he would oppose it. See Brian Shannon, The Time is
Right to Revise the Texas Insanity Defense, 39 TEx. TECH L. REV. 67, 83-88 (2006) (arguing for restoration of
the volitional prong to the Texas insanity formulation); CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS 482-89 (Paul H.
Robinson et al., eds., Oxford University Press 2009) (reactions to the Integrationist Test from Susan Rozelle,
Sherry Colb, Paul Litton, and Matt Matravers.).
9. See Slobogin, An End to Insanity supra note 1, at 1208-22, 1237-39 (outlining the development of
the three common tests for insanity).
10. See id. at 1237-46; SLOBOGIN, MINDING JUSTICE supra note 2, at 36-51. See also Christopher
Slobogin, The Integrationist Alternative to the Insanity Defense: Reflections on the Exculpatory Scope of
Mental Illness in the Wake of the Andrea Yates Trial, 30 AM. J. CRIM. L. 315, 318-32 (2004).
11. MODEL PENAL CODE (U.L.A.) § 4.01 (2001).
12. See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 522-23 (4th ed. 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV-TR] (describing the "essential" feature of a
paraphilia, which includes pedophilia and sexual sadism, as "recurrent, intense sexually arousing fantasies,
sexual urges or behaviors").
13. Even Richard Bonnie, an advocate for a relatively broad insanity test, would not excuse offenders
with "impulse disorders." Richard Bonnie, The Moral Basis of the Insanity Defense, 69 A.B.A. J. 194, 197
(1983). Sex offenders have typically been convicted despite strong evidence of impulsivity, as evidenced by
[Vol. 42:523
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under very strong compulsions are the thousands of addicts who commit crime
to feed their habits.14 Yet these individuals rarely receive mitigation, even at
sentencing. 
5
Sometimes the inability-to-control argument takes the form of a but-for
causation test. 16 The argument goes something like this: But for a particular
condition or event-a certain gene, an abnormal brain structure or chemical
make-up, a bad upbringing, or the ingestion of a particular drug-the crime
would not have occurred. 17  The problem with this type of claim is that it
logically leads to the end of the criminal justice system. All crime is caused in
part by genetic, biological, and environmental factors and thus, under the but-
for test, all crime would have to be excused.'8 These factors should be legally
irrelevant, unless they caused a legally cognizable impairment or help
corroborate its existence.
Although the inability-to-appreciate test attempts to identify such an
impairment, honestly applied it fares no better than the inability-to-control
formulation. As typically expressed, this test excuses the actor if mental illness
caused a "substantial" inability "to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness]"
of one's criminal conduct.' 9 Yet the paradigmatic example of an offender who
cannot emotionally appreciate the wrongfulness of his act is the psychopath,
who is incapable of empathy and remorse.20 Outside of philosophy
21departments, virtually no one is willing to excuse these individuals, who
the fact that sexual predator statutes, which require proof of"dangerousness" caused by a lack of control, are
ordinarily applied to convicted offenders. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358 (1997) (upholding
preventive confinement of convicted sex offenders who have served their term ifthey "suffer from a volitional
impairment rendering them dangerous beyond their control.").
14. See Elaine M. Chiu, The Challenge of Motive in the Criminal Law, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 653,719
(2005) ("As numerous studies have concluded, the most common motive for criminal behavior is that
criminal defendants are drug addicts.").
15. For instance, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines prohibit a downward departure for addiction. See
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINE MANUAL § 5HI.4 (2007). Despite the fact that the guidelines are no longer
mandatory, federal courts continue to hold this stance, at least for mid-level and serious offenders. David M.
Zlotnick, The Future of Federal Sentencing Policy: LearningLessonsfrom Republican JudicialAppointees in
the Guidelines Era, 79 U. COLO. L. REv. 1, 64 (2008).
16. See Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 875 (D.C. Cir. 1954). The most explicit formulation is
the so-called "product test" for insanity. Id.
17. See, e.g., United States v. Alexander, 471 F.2d 923, 959 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon, J., suggesting
that a "rotten social background" may serve as a defense); State v. Pittman 647 S.E.2d 144, 167-69 (S.C.
2005) (discussing the ingestion of Zoloft as a defense); Turpin v. Mobley, 502 S.E.2d 458,463-65 (Ga. 1998)
(discussing a defense based on abuse as a child and low serotonin levels); People v. Yukl, 372 N.Y.S.2d 313,
317-19 (1975) (discussing the presence of an extra Y chromosome as a defense).
18. See generally Stephen J. Morse, Culpability and Control, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1587,1592-93 (1994)
(discussing determinism/universal causation as a control excuse).
19. See MODEL PENAL CODE (U.L.A.) § 4.01 (2001).
20. ROBERT D. HARE, WITHOUT CONSCIENCE: THE DISTURBING WORLD OF THE PSYCHOPATHS
AMONG Us 34, 44 (Pocket Books 1993). Some recent research indicates that these impairments may be due
to deficits in the brain. See, e.g., JAMES BLAIR ET AL., THE PSYCHOPATH: EMOTION AND THE BRAIN 30
(Blackwell Publishing 2005).
21. Morse and Hoffman assert that "[v] irtually all philosophers who have addressed the issue argue that
psychopaths are not morally responsible." Morse & Hoffman, supra note 7, at 1126. As I will argue below,
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occupy between 20-30% of the prison cells in this country22 and are often
viewed as evil incarnate.23  And psychopaths provide only the most
conspicuous example of how the inability-to-appreciate test fails to capture
common intuitions about blameworthiness. Countless other people can be said
to have substantial inability to appreciate the consequences of their behavior,
including those with mild mental retardation and offenders who act impulsively
and therefore unthinkingly.2 4 While some mitigation might be in order for such
offenders, most people would not want to acquit them.25
One might object that the inability-to-control and inability-to-appreciate
tests are only meant to apply to those who are seriously mentally ill.26 But, as
the leading treatise on criminal law points out, no independent work is done by
moral responsibility and legal responsibility are not necessarily the same. See infra text accompanying notes
89-92. In any event, not all philosophers agree with the proposition that psychopaths should be excused. See,
e.g., Heidi Maibom, The Mad, the Bad, and the Psychopath, in NEUROETHICS 167, 168 (2008) ("The
psychopath should not be excused under the insanity defense ...."); Walter Glannon, Moral Responsibility
and the Psychopath, in NEUROETHICS, supra note 21, at 159 (2008) ("The cognitive and affective impairment
in psychopaths is enough to justify mitigated responsibility, but not excuse."). Nor would many of the legal
scholars who argue for a broad insanity defense agree that all psychopaths should be excused. See, e.g.,
Bonnie, supra note 6, at 59; Corrado, supra note 8, at 507-08. The drafters of the Model Penal Code
recognized that their formulation excused psychopaths, and thus added a paragraph specifically meant to
exclude them from its scope. § 4.01(2).
22. Richard Rogers et al., Prototypical Analysis ofAntisocial Personality Disorder: A Study oflnmate
Samples, 27 CRIm. JUST. BEHAV. 234, 242-48 (2000) (finding that somewhat less than 30% of the sampled
prison population meet criteria for psychopathy and over 50% of the population met criteria for antisocial
personality disorder, a less impaired variant of psychopathy).
23. See, e.g., Rachael Bell, Ted Bundy, www.trutv.com/library/crime/serialkillers/notorious/bundy/
14.html (describing psychopath Ted Bundy as "evil reincarnate, a monster, the devil"). Juries routinely reject
insanity defenses based on psychopathy. See David Greenberg & Alan R. Felthous, The Insanity Defense and
Psychopathic Disorders in the United States and Australia, in THE INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF
PSYCHOPATHIC DISORDERS AND THE LAW 255 (Alan R. Felthous & Henning Sass, eds., John Wiley & Sons
2008); Marcus T. Boccaccini et al., Describing, Diagnosing and Naming Psychopathy: How Do Youth
Psychopath Labels Influence Jurors? 26 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 487, 498 (2008). The Supreme Court has even
implied that psychopaths who murder are the ideal candidates for execution. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
551, 573 (2005) (contrasting, for purposes of determining who deserves the most serious condemnation, "the
juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender
whose crime reflects irreparable corruption," and equating the latter with "antisocial personality disorder, a
disorder also referred to as psychopathy or sociopathy, and which is characterized by callousness, cynicism,
and contempt for the feelings, rights, and suffering of others").
24. See State v. Companaro, Union County Indictment No. 632079 (Sup. Ct. N.J. Crim. Div. 1981)
(describing a defendant under tremendous stress as aware of right and wrong but unable to "consider" it); C.
Benjamin Crisman & Rockne J. Chickinell, The Mentally Retarded Offender in Omaha-Douglas Country, 8
CREIGHTON L. REv. 622, 646 (1975) ("Mildly retarded persons may be able to distinguish right from wrong
in the abstract, but they have difficulty applying abstract concepts in specific actual settings and are unable to
appreciate the wrongfulness of what they do.").
25. In Atkins v. Virginia, the Supreme Court made clear that, while people with mental retardation must
be exempted from the death penalty, they may not only be convicted, but sentenced to life in prison without
parole. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318 (2002) (The "deficiencies" of people with mental retardation
"do not warrant an exemption from criminal sanctions"). In most states, people who act impulsively receive at
most mitigation, not excuse, and then only in homicide cases. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE (U.L.A.)
§ 210.3(1)(b) (2001) (recognizing defense to murder for "extreme mental or emotional disturbance").
26. See. e.g., AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, Std.
7-6. 1 (b) (requiring an impairment that "substantially affected the mental or emotional process of the defendant
at the time of the alleged offense.").
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the mental disease or defect language in these formulations; given the wide
array of disabilities that can fit under that predicate, the focus has been on the
functional part of these tests.2  That is why the irrationality formulation
proposed by Michael Moore, Stephen Morse, and others has something to
offer.28 Although no jurisdiction has adopted it, this test is preferable because it
more directly focuses on the precise type of mental disability that is excusing.
29
Unfortunately, the irrationality test also produces questionable results. As
Morse would have it, irrationality excuses because it prevents people from
grasping the right reasons for acting.30 Thus, as he admits, the irrationality test,
like the lack-of-appreciation test, would excuse not only people with
schizophrenia who have fixed false beliefs, but also psychopaths, because
psychopaths cannot grasp why they should care about hurting someone.3'
Moreover, a test based on difficulty in grasping the right reasons for
acting could well excuse the average Islamic fundamentalist, who cannot
fathom why it is wrong to kill Americans simply because they are Americans.
It will not suffice to argue that the fundamentalist can be distinguished from the
person with severe mental illness by reference to the latter's brain defects or
chemical imbalances. As Morse himself has argued (and as reiterated above),
causative factors like these are irrelevant; what matters are the offender's
desires and beliefs at the time of the act.32 Religious terrorists find it just as
difficult to understand why their victims do not deserve to die as people with
paranoia who erroneously believe their victim is threatening them.33 Nor does
the fact that religious fanatics might be persuaded that their beliefs are wrong
distinguish them from mentally ill people whose delusions can be eliminated
through medication; the only difference between the two is the type of
intervention needed to effect change. Indeed, given the effectiveness of anti-
27. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CiMINAL LAw 377 (4th ed. 2003) ("It would seem that any mental
abnormality, be it psychosis, neurosis, organic brain disorder, or congenital intellectual deficiency (low IQ or
feeblemindedness), will suffice ifit has caused the consequences described in the second part of the test."); id.
at 380 (even if psychopathy is not considered a mental illness for purposes of the insanity defense, "the
'disease of the mind' element of M'Naghten is not itselfa unique limiting factor, as the psychopath likewise
could not qualify under the lack-of-cognition requirement.").
28. See MICHAEL S. MOORE, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY: RETHINKING THE RELATIONSHIP 100-08
(Cambridge University Press 1984); Stephen J. Morse, Rationality and Responsibility, 74 S. CAL. L. REV.
251,252-58 (2000); see also Paul Litton, Responsibility Status of the Psychopath: On Moral Reasoning and
Rational Self-Governance, 39 RUTGERS L.J. 349, 353 (2008) (explaining that the insane are exempt from
obligations because they are irrational).
29. See SLOBOGIN, MINDING JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 46.
30. Stephen J. Morse, Immaturity and Responsibility, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMNOLOGY 15, 30 (1997).
See also Morse, supra note 28, at 255 (defining rationality as "the ability to act for good reasons").
31. Morse, supra note 28, at 264 ("1 believe that [psychopaths] are morally irrational and should be
excused.").
32. See Morse, supra note 18, at 1595, 1653-54.
33. Terrorists are routinely described in terms of their "unshakeable" beliefs. See, e.g., Arie W.
Kruglanski, Inside the Terrorist Mind, paper presented at the National Academy of Science, Apr. 29, 2002,
www.hyd-masti.com/2008/09/inside-terrorist-mind-paper-by-arie-w.htinl ("One does not readily massacre
innocents, or sacrifice one's own life unless one had an unshakeable belief in an ideology that legitimizes and
requires this.").
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psychotic medication and the adamancy of many religious believers, the latter
group may well be more intransigent.
34
II. THE INTEGRATIONIST PROPOSAL
Mental illness can have an exculpatory effect. But because the various
tests for insanity, applied literally, excuse people we clearly do not want to
excuse, a different means of assessing the blameworthiness of offenders whose
crimes are caused by mental disability would be preferable. I propose that we
assess the culpability of such offenders under the same relatively subjectivized
framework that the MPC applies to people who are not mentally ill. In other
words, I propose the elimination of the special defense of insanity and the
integration of defenses for people with mental illness into the other standard
defenses. Below is a sketch of how this proposal would work. Subsequent
sections explain its rationale.
In a break with tradition, the MPC requires that criminal liability be
evaluated in terms of the defendant's actual knowledge and belief, not a
reasonable person's knowledge and belief.35 I argue below that this subjective
focus holds true even when liability is based on negligence, given the way the
MPC defines that term.36 For now, however, put aside negligence crimes and
consider how the MPC's subjective approach to all other crimes would affect
offenders with mental illness.
First, note that all of the MPC's defensive force formulations-§§ 3.02
through 3.08-provide that use of force is excused if the actor believes
justifying circumstances, such as an imminent threat to one's life or property,
exist.37 Applying this idea to an offender with mental illness, consider Daniel
M'Naghten, the person with paranoid schizophrenia whose case led to the most
famous insanity test.38 M'Naghten shot at Prime Minister Robert Peel (killing
his secretary instead) apparently believing that Peel had ordered his minions to
assassinate him and after complaining to the police about the situation to no
avail.39 M'Naghten was obviously mistaken in his beliefs, but had they been
true, those beliefs arguably provided a justification for his act.
34. On the efficacy of medication in treating serious mental disorder, see Douglas Mossman,
'Unbuckling the Chemical Straitjacket': The Legal Significance ofRecent Advances in the Pharmacological
Treatment of Psychosis, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1033, 1062-81 (2002).
35. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02, cmt. 2 (1985) ("It was believed to be unjust to measure liability for
serious criminal offenses on the basis of what the defendant should have believed or what most people would
have intended.").
36. See id. § 2.02(d).
37. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE (U.L.A.) § 3.02(1) (2001) ("Conduct that the actor believes to be
necessary to avoid a harm or evil to himself or to another is justifiable, provided that.., the harm or evil
sought to be avoided by such conduct is greater than that sought to be prevented by the law defining the
offense charged .... ).
38. See THOMAS MAEDER, CRIME AND MADNESS: THE ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF THE INSANITY
DEFENSE 23-27 (Harper & Row 1985).
39. Id. at 24-25.
[Vol. 42:523
HeinOnline  -- 42 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 528 2009-2010
A DEFENSE OF THE INTEGRATIONIST TEST
Section 2.09, the MPC's duress provision, provides a defense when a
crime is a response to coercion that a person of reasonable firmness, in the
actor's situation, would be unable to resist.40 Despite the reasonableness
language, the commentary to this provision makes clear that it is to apply
"when an actor mistakenly believes that a threat to use unlawful force [against
him] has been made. '41 A case involving mental illness in which this defense
might have been relevant is that of James Hadfield, who in the eighteenth
century allegedly believed that God would end the world-and Hadfield-if he
did not shoot the King (like M'Naghten and John Hinckley, he missed his
target).42
Finally, § 2.02 defines mens rea subjectively, meaning, for instance, that
even if a reasonable person would know he or she is shooting a living person,
an honest belief that the person one shoots is dead is an excuse to murder.43 A
possible example of a person with mental illness who might have had a mens
rea defense under this formulation is Eric Clark, the defendant whose case went
to the Supreme Court two terms ago. 44 If, as Clark alleged, he believed he was
shooting an alien rather than a person, he did not have the mens rea for murder
or reckless homicide.45
Now assume that the charge in the M'Naghten, Hadfield, and Clark cases
had been negligent homicide.46 Homicide is one of the few MPC crimes for
which negligence can lead to conviction, and negligence is usually based on
assumptions about the mindset of the reasonable person, who presumably is
never mentally ill.47 Note, however, how § 2.02 defines negligence:
A person acts negligently.., when he should be aware of a substantial and
unjustifiable risk... [which] must be of such a nature and degree that the
actor's failure to perceive it, considering the nature and purpose of his
conduct and the circumstances known to him, involves a gross deviation from
the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the actor's
situation.48
40. MODEL PENAL CODE (U.L.A.) § 2.09(1) (2001).
41. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 cmt. 3 (1985) (emphasis added).
42. Richard Moran, The Origin of Insanity as a Special Verdict: The Trial for Treason of James
Hadfield (1800), 19 LAw & Soc'y REv. 487, 504-05 (1985) (describing defense attorney's argument that
Hadfield shot at the King not to kill him but as a way of ending his own life, which he wanted to do because
"[h]e thought that the world would end soon, and that like Jesus Christ he was to sacrifice his life for the
salvation of others"). The Hadfield case is probably better analyzed, however, under MPC § 3.02, the Code's
"general necessity" defense, which the Code's commentaries indicate would excuse the intentional killing of
one person in order to save the lives of two or more persons. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 cmt. 1 (1985).
43. See MODEL PENAL CODE (U.L.A.) § 2.02 (2001).
44. See Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735 (2006).
45. See id. at 745.
46. See MODEL PENAL CODE (U.L.A.) § 210.4 (2001).
47. See id. Simple assault and statutory rape are the only other two major crimes for which negligence
can lead to criminal liability under the MPC. See id. §§ 211.1(1), 213.6(1).
48. § 2.02(2)(d) (emphasis added).
20091
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Even assuming a reasonable person would not be mentally ill and thus that
mental illness should not be considered part of "the actor's situation," the
"circumstances known" to the actor are supposed to define when the act is
reasonable. The circumstances known to M'Naghten, Hadfield, and Clark
involved, respectively, being stalked by government agents, the apocalypse, and
threats from aliens; given those circumstances, a plausible (albeit bizarre)
argument can be made that their actions were not a gross deviation from the
standard of care.4 9 In effect, § 2.02's language can be said to fold a negligence
analysis into an inquiry about whether the person's beliefs, if true, would
amount to justification, which is the same inquiry mandated under the other
defensive force provisions.
50
These are the grounds for exculpation under the Integrationist Test.5Y But
they are all limited by two other sections of the MPC that place limitations on
justification and duress. First, as § 3.09(1) makes clear, a defendant cannot
succeed if his claim is a mistake about the criminal law rather than the facts.5 2
Thus, just as a non-mentally ill person from a foreign country would not be
excused even if he honestly believed the law permits him to avenge adultery
with homicide, an offender (such as a client I once had) whose mental
retardation leads him to believe it is legal to kill in response to a taunt would
not have a defense under the integrationist approach. Second, even if one of
the three grounds described above is met, all the defensive force provisions
provide that if a defendant causes the conditions of his excuse by, for instance,
putting himself in danger, then the defense is not available. 3 The prosecution
49. Clark also alleged that he thought aliens were trying to kill him. Clark, 548 U.S. at 745.
50. Under this interpretation, people who would ordinarily be excused under the involuntary act doctrine
could also be excused on lack ofmens rea grounds. See MODEL PENAL CODE (U.L.A.) § 2.01 (2001). People
who harm another as a result of a seizure or while sleepwalking are not only not in control of their bodies but
are non-negligent in causing harm (unless, as indicated below, they know the danger posed by their condition
and fail to avoid the dangerous situation). See infra text accompanying notes 52-53.
51. Originally, I also proposed an excuse based on ignorance of the concept of good and evil, which was
meant to apply to individuals who are so impaired due to mental disability that, like two year-olds, they do not
fathom the basic legal framework, much less its application in a specific context. See SLOBOGIN, MINDING
JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 54-55. Morse and Hoffman argue that this component of the test would excuse
psychopaths, who Morse and Hoffman claim cannot grasp the concept of good and evil. Morse & Hoffman,
supra note 7, at 1126. There is a significant difference between infants and psychopaths, the latter of whom
at least know we think that what they do is wrong. See infra text accompanying notes 89-92. Rather than
enter this debate about epistemology, however, I am not advancing this particular aspect of the original
proposal here for two reasons: (1) the MPC does not recognize such an excuse (and thus this component is not
technically integrationist); and (2) the other components of the test, particularly the lack of mens rea
component, will cover the offenders whom I think should be excused on this ground. See MODEL PENAL
CODE (U.L.A.) § 2 (2001). The latter assertion is only likely to be wrong, if ever, in connection with crime
committed by extremely young offenders, whom I believe should be handled through an entirely separate
system in any event. Christopher Slobogin & Mark Fondacaro, Juvenile Justice: The Fourth Option, 95 IOWA
L. REV. (forthcoming 2009).
52. MODEL PENAL CODE (U.L.A.) §§ 3.09(), 2.09.
53. See, e.g., § 3.02(2) ("When the actor was reckless or negligent in bringing about the situation
requiring a choice of harms or evils or in appraising the necessity for his conduct, the justification afforded by
this Section is unavailable in a prosecution for any offense for which recklessness or negligence, as the case
may be, suffices to establish culpability."); see also § 2.09(2) (discussing the defense of duress in those
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made this kind of argument in the Andrea Yates case, where evidence was
introduced that Yates intentionally stopped taking her medication and thus
caused her insanity at the time she drowned her five children. 54 To deprive
mentally ill offenders of a defense on this ground, however, the prosecution
would have to show either that they were aware or that they should have been
aware of a substantial risk that discontinuation of treatment would lead to
violence."5
Now that the basic structure of the integrationist approach has been laid
out, the various criticisms of it can be examined. These criticisms can be
organized under three general categories: (1) the test is under-theorized; (2) it
fails to exculpate offenders who clearly should be excused; and (3) it suffers
from implementation difficulties. Each of these general criticisms comes in
several guises.
11. CRITICISM # 1: No POSITIVE THEORY
The first lack-of-theory criticism comes from Stephen Morse and Morris
Hoffman, who state that I fail to "provide an argument for thoroughgoing
subjectivization of the criteria for justification and negligence," which is the
position that underlies the integrationist approach.5 6 This criticism has both a
descriptive and a prescriptive component. First, Morse and Hoffnan note that
under traditional legal theory offenders are not excused for mistakes that are
unreasonable-which, as pointed out above, is usually true of mistakes by
people with mental illness--and further argue that even under the MPC's
subj ectivized approach to criminal liability people with mental disability should
not be excused for negligence crimes; doing so, they say, would be
"incoherent" because a "reasonable abnormal person is simply not
reasonable. 57  Second, Morse and Hoffman contend that exonerating "a
culpably careless wrongdoer the same as a deluded wrongdoer makes a
mockery of the moral differences between them."'5 8
instances when the actor is negligent or reckless); id. § 3.09(2) (discussing negligently or recklessly held
beliefs as related to the justified use of force).
54. According to the prosecution's expert in the first trial, Yates intentionally failed to take her
medication, despite knowing that failing to do so made her very irritable with her children. Timothy Roche,
Andrea Yates: More to the Story, TIME, Mar. 18, 2002, available at http:www.time.comtimenation/article/
0,8599,21 8445-2,00.html.
55. More specifically, under the integrationist approach Yates would be guilty of murder only if she was
practically certain or indifferent to the fact that going off her meds would lead to violence (not just to
irritability, as the prosecution alleged). Cf MODEL PENAL CODE (U.LA.) § 210.2 (2001) (requiring at least
extreme indifference to the value of human fife for a murder conviction). She would only be guilty of
negligent homicide if she should have been aware of this consequence. See id. § 210.4.
56. Morse & Hoffman, supra note 7, at 1128.
57. Id. at 1127-28. See also Paul Litton, Against Integrationism, in CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS,
supra note 8, at 486, 486 (Paul H. Robinson et al., eds., Oxford University Press 2009).
58. Morse & Hoffman, supra note 7, at 1128.
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Let us take these two sets of complaints one at a time. Although Morse
and Hoffman are right that the common law does not excuse unreasonable
mistakes, they are too quick to reach the same conclusion about the MPC's
approach to negligence. As indicated above, that approach appears to rest the
negligence analysis on the circumstances known to the actor.59  Such an
interpretation of the MPC is not "incoherent." If mental illness were
considered part of the actor's "situation," thus allowing complete individuation
of the legal inquiry into whether an offender with mental problems acted
reasonably, the MPC's language would, as Morse and Hoffman assert, be
rendered meaningless as a negligence standard. But a standard that requires the
actor to act reasonably, given what he knows, can still be called a reasonable
person standard.
Morse and Hoffman's second complaint is that excusing people with
mental illness based on such a standard, rather than on one that focuses
forthrightly on irrationality, makes a "mockery" of the differences between
these wrongdoers and simply careless ones.60 They contend that offenders with
serious mental illness are "incapable of getting the facts right," whereas careless
offenders "have the capacity to pay attention and to be as careful as we expect
them to be," but do not exercise that capacity. 61 I agree that many offenders
with mental illness do not discern any possibility that their view of the world is
wrong. But it is not clear that the people whom Morse and Hoffman call
careless are, at the time of their offense, any more "capable" of discerning that
possibility. Based on this concern as well as others, a number of scholars have
rejected objectively defined negligence as a basis of criminal liability.62 These
scholars continue to defend the position that Glanville Williams and Jerome
Hall took years ago: culpability determinations should not be based on what a
reasonable person would know or believe, but instead should be based on what
the defendant actually knew or believed.63 Morse and Hoffman are free to
reject these contentions, but they are wrong to suggest the contentions are not
plausible (or that I have not made them, since I cross-referenced these
arguments in my earlier work).64
Admittedly, in ajurisdiction that does not take the MPC's approach to the
affirmative defenses or define negligence in the manner described above, the
approach advocated in this article could no longer accurately be called
59. See supra Part n1.
60. Morse & Hoffman, supra note 7, at 1128.
61. Id. at 1128-29.
62. See, e.g., Larry Alexander, Insufficient Concern: A Unified Conception of Criminal Culpability, 88
CAL. L. REV. 931, 932, 950 (2000) ("Although one who is negligent on a particular occasion may in fact be
one who would act recklessly when given the opportunity, only when he does act recklessly can we deem him
to have acted culpably .... Even if inadvertence to risk is sometimes the product of a culpable act, it is still
not culpable. It is merely the nonculpable product of some prior culpable act."); Stephen Garvey, W1hen
Shoulda Mistake of Fact Excuse?, 42 TEx. TECH L. REV. 359,359 (2009).
63. GLANVILLE WIiIAms, CRIMINAL LAw: TH-E GENERAL PART 32-34,123 (2d ed. 1961); see Jerome
Hall, Negligent Behavior Should Be Excludedfrom Penal Liability, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 632 (1963).
64. SLOBOGIN, MINDING JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 35.
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"integrationist." A "special defense" for offenders with mental illness would
still be needed, albeit one that focuses solely on whether, at the time of the
crime, they lacked subjectified mens rea or believed they were confronted by
circumstances that would be justifying or coercive if true. In this technical
sense, Morse and Hoffman are correct that integrationism has a shaky
foothold.65
A deeper challenge to the rationale for the Integrationist Test is that it is
not based on a comprehensive view of human accountability. Morse and
Hoffman assert that I do not "embed [my) critique in a concept of the person or
a jurisprudence of responsibility... .'66 Susan Rozelle avers that the
Integrationist Test merely "explains who should be excused, not why.' 67 Paul
Litton states that I provide no "account of responsibility's basis. '68 Matt
Matravers suggests that, without looking at Kantian, Humean, Aristotelian,
and other philosophical theories, we cannot determine who should be
excused.69 Litton and Matravers add that I rely too heavily on intuitions about
community views concerning pedophiles, psychopaths, and the like; although
they concede that such intuitions are relevant to the analysis, they believe that I
make them dispositive.70
These writers are correct that my earlier work did not set out a theory of
personhood. Their suggestion that I should have said more in that work about
my first premises is also well taken. But meeting their concerns does not
require a particularly elaborate theoretical account, as I will now demonstrate.
All of these scholars conclude, in effect, that the integrationist approach is
under-theorized because it fails to grapple sufficiently with the issue of when a
person lacks "capacity.''71 1 have never used the capacity terminology that is
popular among scholars who write about the insanity defense because, as I
develop later in this paper, the concept is so protean. The most direct response
65. A similar criticism made by Morse and Hoffman is harder to fathom. They contend that my
recognition, in other work, of a broad defense for mental disability at sentencing (one that they liken to
diminished rationality) is "fundamentally" inconsistent with the integrationist approach, because the latter is
not based on irrationality. Morse & Hoffman, supra note 7, at 1131. This characterization of my approach is
misleading. See SLOBOGIN, MINDING JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 82. But even assuming it is correct, their
complaint doesn't compute. My proposal for people with mental disability is identical to the approach the
MPC adopts for people who are not mentally ill, to wit, a recognition of subjective mens rea, justification, and
duress defenses at trial and a wide range of mitigation at sentencing, including "substantial grounds tending to
excuse or justify the defendant's criminal conduct, though failing to establish a defense." See MODEL PENAL
CODE § 7.01(2)(d). If the MPC's approach to trial and sentencing is consistent, so is mine.
66. Id. at 1125.
67. Susan Rozelle, No Excuse for You, in CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS, supra note 8, at 482.
68. Litton, supra note 57, at 486.
69. Matt Matravers, Justifying Defenses, in CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS 489 (Paul H. Robinson et
al., eds., Oxford University Press 2009).
70. Litton, supra note 57, at 487 ("Widespread intuitions about particular cases are important to
theorizing and evaluating proposed standards, but especially when controversial, they neither control
unconditionally nor necessarily trump our general commitments."); Mairavers, supra note 69, at 488 ("[Wlere
we only to test our theories against our convictions, and always favor the latter, we would diminish the
possibilities offered by philosophical reflection.").
71. See, e.g., Litton, supra note 57, at 486-87.
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to these types of criticisms, however, is that people who intentionally commit
crime in the absence of beliefs that sound in justification or duress have
whatever capacity the law demands. In suggesting otherwise, Morse and
Hoffman state that "[w]e do not expect other animals to understand the reason
for a rule or the deterrent value of punishment because other animals are not
capable of the same degree of rationality as homo sapiens. There are no chimp
legislatures or avian police., 72 But people with mental illness are very different
from monkeys and birds; as Morse and Hoffman themselves state earlier in the
same article, "mental disorder seldom disables a person's moral compass. The
person may be making a 'moral mistake' because his or her perceptions and
beliefs are distorted by disorder, but the moral sense generally remains intact.
73
If that is true,74 no further justification is needed for focusing the criminal
responsibility determination solely on the person's perceptions and beliefs. The
key issue should be whether the person, mentally ill or not, perceived reality in
a way that renders his acts culpable, as defined by the moral compass we all
share. That is precisely the determination the Integrationist Test demands.
From there, the theoretical justification for integrationism is
straightforward. Looking, as it should, at the desires and beliefs of the offender
at the time of the offense, the Integrationist Test evaluates people who are
mentally ill in terms of the traditional purposes of punishment. People who kill
because they think that otherwise they will be killed, that the world will end, or
that an alien life form will accost them--which arguably describes M'Naghten,
Hadfield, and Clark-are neither culpable nor deterrable, and should be
excused even if their beliefs are unreasonable. In contrast, the case for
excusing people, mentally ill or not, who intentionally offend in the absence of
beliefs that sound in justification or duress is much weaker, from both a
retributive and a deterrence perspective.75 Although it should be clear from the
foregoing that I agree with Litton and Matravers that "folk wisdom" should not
be dispositive of criminal law issues, 76 it is also worth noting that the little
research that exists on the topic indicates that the integrationist approach is
72. Morse & Hoffrnan, supra note 7, at 1117.
73. Id.
74. I think it is, even with respect to psychopaths. See infra text accompanying notes 89-92. Note that
if a person does lack this moral sense, the Integrationist Test would not excuse because it would result in a
mistake of criminal law. See supra text accompanying note 52. But in these extremely rare cases the mental
impairment is probably so severe that mens rea will be lacking as well. See supra note 51.
75. Cf Janine Young Kim, Rule and Exception in Criminal Law (Or Are Criminal Defenses
Necessary?), 84 TUL. L. REV. 247, 285 (arguing that "because the dominant and consistent theme of the law
of offenses is harm, not culpability," the criminal law could legitimately jettison the insanity defense but not
the justification defenses).
76. See Christopher Slobogin, Is Justice Just Us? Using Social Science to Inform Substantive Criminal
Law, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 315, 323 (1996) ("Beyond establishing the fundamental issues upon
which virtually everyone agrees (e.g., that unjustified homicide should be a crime), lay opinions about the
content of the criminal code are of questionable value.").
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better at capturing lay views about when mental illness should excuse than any
77of the other tests currently in use.
IV. CRTICISM #2: Too NARROW
The next set of complaints about the Integrationist Test is that, even if it
does have a plausible theoretical underpinning, it does not capture the proper
scope of an excuse based on mental disability. A number of commentators
have argued that the Integrationist Test fails because some people who commit
crime intentionally and whose mistaken beliefs are not justificatory nonetheless
clearly deserve to be exculpated. 78 This claim that the Integrationist Test is too
narrow comes in three distinct forms.
The biggest broadside comes from commentators like Warren
Brookbanks, who contends that regardless of their precise motivations for
committing crime, "patently mentally impaired persons [should not be required]
to bear the full weight of legal sanctions., 79 The problem with this argument is
that the insanity defense is an incredibly inefficient mechanism for assuring
treatment for people with mental illness. Today, there are well over half a
million offenders who have experienced serious mental problems.80  The
insanity defense cannot and should not be the vehicle for getting them the
treatment they need. A narrow defense for people with mental illness is not
inhumane; what is inhumane is failing to give these people treatment, whether
they end up in the mental health or the correctional system.
Putting the treatment concern aside as a red herring, the focus can turn to
whether the Integrationist Test captures all of those mentally ill people who
should be excused due to a lack of blameworthiness. Richard Bonnie believes
the answer is no. He believes, instead, that the focus of an excuse based on
,,8 1mental illness should be on the "intensity of the psychotic experience,
meaning the degree to which psychosis detaches the individual from reality.
77. See Norman J. Finkel & Christopher Slobogin, Insanity, Justification, and Culpability Toward a
Unifying Schema, 19 LAW& HUM. BEHAV. 447,457,460 (1995). Tables I and 3 in this study can be used to
compare laypersons' views on seven cases under a "No Instruction" condition, the two-prong ALl test, the
federal insanity test (which is the current test most like the irrationality standard), and the Integrationist Test.
Id. This comparison reveals that, in four of the seven cases, the latter test came closest to reaching the same
results as the no instruction condition, while the ALl test came closest in two of the cases, and the federal test
closest in the final case. Id. The Integrationist Test was second closest to the no instruction condition in two
of the latter three cases and a close third in the third case. Id.
78. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
79. Warren Brookbanks, Minding Justice: Laws that Deprive People with MentalDisability ofLife and
Liberty, II NEW CRIM. L. REv. 172, 174 (2008).
80. According to a 1998 report from the federal government, 283,830 inmates in prison or jail reported
previous treatment for mental or emotional problems, an overnight stay in a mental hospital, or both, and
547,800 offenders on probation reported symptoms of mental illness. PAULA M. DrrrON, MENTAL HEALTH
AND TREATMENT OF INMATES AND PROBATIONERS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS REPORT (1998),
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/press/mhtip.pr (basing conclusions on surveys of federal and
state systems conducted in 1995, 1996, and 1997).
81. Bonnie, supra note 6, at 59-60.
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But, gauging the disability excuse by reference to the extent of psychosis or, as
the irrationality theorists would do, the ability to correct factual premises,82 is
simply too "arbitrary," to use the word Bonnie applies to the Integrationist Test.
As Dr. Drew Ross, who has studied psychotic killers, concluded: "[P]sychosis
may enhance and enact the drama already present, and the drama is not
necessarily an innocent one.,
83
People with psychosis, like people who are not mentally ill, often commit
crimes out of anger, frustration, jealousy, and hate.84 They should not be
excused simply because they have a particular diagnosis, a confused thought
process, or "uncorrectable" perceptions about the world. John Hinckley, Ted
Kaczynski, and Charles Manson all had schizophrenia and all were highly
delusional at times, with fixed false beliefs about their situation. Yet none of
these people should have been excused-Hinckley because he tried to kill
President Reagan to impress an actress,8 5 Kaczynski because he sent out mail
bombs to end the spread of technology,8 6 and Manson because he slaughtered
innocent white people to ignite a race war.8 7 Professor Arnold Loewy's paper
for this symposium, which argues for a position very similar to the one
advanced here, provides further examples of cases in which people with serious
mental problems nonetheless have insufficiently exculpatory motives for
88
crime.
If psychosis, even intense psychosis, should not automatically excuse, then
presumably psychopathy, which is generally considered to be a lesser
impairment, should not either. Those who think otherwise assert that the
psychopathic offender is utterly incapable of understanding why we consider
his actions reprehensible and harmful.89 Assuming that to be the case,
psychopaths still perceive reality accurately and understand that we do not want
them to commit criminal offenses.90 If they nonetheless commit crime, the
82. See Morse & Hoffman, supra note 7, at 1124 ("The responsibility-diminishing mental state in
rationality tests consists of crazy perceptions and beliefs that are not a result of carelessness and not
correctable by reason or evidence.").
83. DREW Ross, LOOKING INTO THE EYES OF A KILLER: A PSYCHIATRIST'S JOURNEY THROUGH THE
MURDERER'S WORLD 87 (Plenum Trade 1998).
84. See Jeffrey W. Swanson et al., Alternative Pathways to Violence in Persons with Schizophrenia: The
Role of ChildhoodAntisocial Behavior Problems, 32 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 228 (2007) (providing evidence
that "violence in schizophrenia patients may result from many factors besides the symptoms of
schizophrenia").
85. See CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN ET AL., LAW & THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM: CIYIL AND CRIMINAL
ASPECTS 563-64 (5th ed. 2009).
86. See William Glaberson, Kaczynski Can't Drop Lawyers or Block a Mental Illness Defense, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 8, 1998, at Al.
87. See VINCENT BUGLIOSI & CURT GENERY, HELTER SKELTER: THE TRUE STORY OF THE MANSON
MURDERS 218 (W.W. Norton & Co. 1974).
88. Loewy, supra note 5, at 514-18.
89. See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse, Psychopathy and CriminalResponsibility, in NEUROETHICS 208 (2008)
("[Psychopaths do not have the capacity for moral rationality, at least when their behavior implicates moral
concerns, and thus they are not responsible.").
90. Maibom, supra note 21, at 167 ("[P]sychopaths are able to correctly identify what actions they are
performing, determine whether those actions are right or wrong, and control their actions.").
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pragmatic retributivist should have no problem finding psychopaths
blameworthy, and from a general deterrence- perspective the last thing we
should want to do is tell these offenders that they will be excused rather than
punished for their harmful behavior. In short, even if a person is morally
insane, as psychopaths are sometimes said to be,9' that does not mean the
92person is legally insane.
Coming at the Integrationist Test from a different angle, Michael Corrado
argues that cognitive impairment of the type contemplated by that test (as well
as by the lack-of-appreciation and irrationality tests) is not the gravamen of
insanity.93 Rather, he argues that a person should be excused when he "cannot
avoid performing the act.",94 While such a person might also manifest an
inability to reason or appreciate the wrongfulness of an action, Corrado
contends that these defects of reason are "based upon defects of control ....
This view contrasts with the views of commentators like Morse, who believe
that a loss of control is best conceptualized as an inability to reason.96
The circularity of this debate suggests that it is not resolvable. For present
purposes, however, the important point is that, as a normative matter, this
debate should also be irrelevant. Consider the case of Andrew Goldstein,
which appears to provide a paradigmatic example of volitional impairment and
which also might be seen as a good illustration of irrationality.97 Clearly
suffering from schizophrenia at the time, Goldstein pushed a woman whom he
had never met in front of a subway, apparently acting on the spur of the
moment.98 Although he admitted he knew the woman might die from his
action, he also stated, in describing this and other pushing incidents, that
"[w]hen it happens, I don't think; it just goes whoosh, whoosh, push, you
know. It's like a random variable." 99
Assuming this is an accurate description of his mental state, Goldstein's
actions do seem extremely impulsive and irrational. But compare his case to
the famous scenario proffered by Sir James Fitzjames Stephen as an example of
the type of homicide that should be considered just as culpable as a
premeditated killing: the man who sees a boy sitting on a bridge and, without
knowing him or having any particular reason for doing so ("out of mere wanton
91. See Carl Elliott & Grant Gillett, Moral Insanity and Practical Reason, 5 PHIL. PSYCHOL. 53, 53
(1992) (quoting J. C. PRICHARD, A TREATISE ON INSANITY (1835)).
92. Cf Robin Bradley Kar, The Deep Structure of Law and Morality, 84 TEX. L. REV. 877, 889-90
(2006) (distinguishing between moral and legal obligations in the case of psychopaths).
93. Corrado, supra note 8, at 502.
94. Id. at 508.
95. Id. at 484.
96. Stephen J. Morse, Uncontrollable Urges and Irrational People, 88 VA. L. REv. 1025, 1064 (2002)
("Lack of capacity for rationality is almost always the most straightforward explanation of why we colloquially
say that some people cannot control themselves when they experience intense desires.").
97. See PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW: CASE STUDIES AND CONTROVERSIES 579-83 (2d ed. 2008)
(describing the Goldstein case).
98. Id. at 581-83.
99. Id. at 583.
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barbarity"), pushes him off the bridge.'0° What is the difference between the
latter, clearly culpable individual (call him Blackstein) and Goldstein? Intent?
As far as we can tell, Goldstein's act, although highly impulsive, was as
intentional as Blackstein's; Goldstein seemed to wait until the train got there.' 0
Was the act more "in character" for Blackstein? No, because Goldstein's
character includes his mental illness.
Did Blackstein perhaps possess a greater capacity to avoid killing, due
either to a stronger "will" or better access to other options? The practical
difficulty of answering this sort of question in cases like Blackstein's and
Goldstein's, when the acts are both intentional and impulsive, is explored in the
next section. 02 The normative challenge raised by the question is exposed by
this comment from H.L.A. Hart:
[A] theory that mental operations like... thinking about.., a situation are
somehow "either there or not there," and so utterly outside our control, can
lead to the theory that we are never responsible .... For just as . . .
[someone] might say "My mind was a blank" or "I just forgot" or "I just
didn't think, I could not help not thinking," so the cold-blooded murderer
might say "I just decided to kill, I couldn't help deciding."'103
Hart's observation suggests that if we exculpate Goldstein because he could not
contemplate any options, we need to excuse Blackstein because he could
contemplate only one.
Unless we want to exculpate people like Blackstein, we need a different
method of assessing culpability than current insanity tests offer. The most
obvious alternative method is the one we already use in ordinary cases. In
determining the culpability of the ordinary offender (like Blackstein) we look at
his desires and beliefs at the time of the crime. 104 Likewise, in determining the
culpability of the offender with mental illness (like Goldstein), we should
examine the desires and beliefs that accompany the crime, not the disability's
intensity (as Bonnie or Morse would have it) or its causative contribution (as
Corrado wants to do). Under the integrationist approach, Goldstein might be
found to have lacked the mens rea for first-degree murder (he said he did not do
it "on purpose"), but he probably would be guilty of some form of homicide
(and indeed, he was convicted of second degree murder despite assertion of an
insanity defense). 10 5
100. 3 JAMES FrrZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW IN ENGLAND 94 (1883).
101. ROBINSON, supra note 97, at 582.
102. See infra Part V.
103. H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 151 (2d ed.,
Oxford University Press 2008) (1968).
104. See Morse, supra note 18, at 1556.
105. Anemona Hartocollis, A Subway Nightmare Will be the Focus of Yet a Third Trial, N.Y. TIMES,
May 23, 2006. The conviction was overturned on Sixth Amendment grounds and Goldstein eventually
pleaded guilty to manslaughter, agreeing to a sentence of twenty-three years and five years of parole. See
Anemona Hartocollis, Nearly Eight Years Later, Guilty Plea in Subway Killing, N.Y. TMES, Oct. 11, 2006
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Many other people with mental illness would be excused in an
integrationist regime, however. The cases of M'Naghten, Hadfield, and Clark
have already been offered as illustrations of that possibility.' 6 Consider two
other examples. Andrea Yates was not culpable for drowning her children if, as
her experts claimed, she thought that otherwise they would go to Hell and that
their drowning would assure they would go to Heaven. 10 7 Wendell Williamson
(a case mentioned by Corrado) should be excused if, like Hadfield, he thought
his crimes would save the world.10 8
V. CRITICISM #3: Too DIFFICULT AND BIZARRE
Even if one buys the argument that, as a normative matter, the
Integrationist Test is not too draconian, one might still be concerned about
implementation issues. Brookbanks and Guyora Binder, among others, have
suggested that making the assessments required by the Integrationist Test are
simply too difficult.' 9 This last complaint comes in a number of versions.
First, there is the straightforward concern about malingering. Once
offenders find out that all they have to do to get a defense is prove they felt
threatened by the victim, they might make up the appropriate story. Even
people with real mental illness malinger to get what they want, and this test
seems to give them an easy way to do so.' 10 The only response here is that the
other tests create the same problem. The Appreciation Test excuses if the
defendant can convince the factfinder that he could not internalize the
wrongfulness of the act, the Irrationality Test excuses if the accused can prove
he could not come up with noncriminal options, and most easily feigned of all,
the Volitional Test excuses if the person can persuade the jury he could not
help himself. Mental health professionals have been dealing with claims in all
of these areas for years, and they are no worse at sizing up stories relevant to
integrationism than they are at evaluating the validity of these other types of
assertions.' Il
Indeed, the Integrationist Test is superior to the other tests on a practical
level because, as suggested by my earlier comments, it avoids a conundrum that
(also noting the prosecution's argument that Goldstein had a history of using his mental illness to excuse his
bad behavior).
106. See supra Part H.
107. Joel Anderson, Andrea Yates Said She Drowned Children to Protect Them from Damnation,
Psychiatrist Testifies, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 2, 2002, available at www.highbeam.com/doc/IPI-
51097723.html.
108. Corrado, supra note 8, at 496-97.
109. See Binder, personal conversation with author, Jan. 7, 2009; Brookbanks, supra note 79, at 174.
110. See GARY B. MELTON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS: A HANDBOOK
FOR MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS AND LAWYERS 57 (3d ed., The Guilford Press 2007) (noting that
people with mental illness often exaggerate their symptoms).
I ll. Id. at 56-62 (explaining the techniques for detecting "response styles" of people claiming mental
illness).
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the other tests cannot."12 With the inability-to-control test, the conundrum has
commonly been expressed as follows: How do we know when an impulse is
irresistible or simply not resisted? 1 3 Research shows that most people who
experience command hallucinations do not act on the commands.1 4 How do
we know whether the person with such hallucinations who does commit a crime
was compelled to do so or instead simply "chose" this moment to give into
them? The same conundrum arises with the two cognitive tests, which excuse
when the person could not grasp the right reasons for acting conatively or
cognitively. Research shows that even people with delusional paranoia usually
do not act on perceived threats unless they are serious. 15 How do we know
whether a paranoid person who reacts to a perceived threat could not grasp the
right reasons for acting or instead just ignored them?"16
If instead we simply ask whether the mistaken perception, if true,
confronts these people with a situation in which causing harm would be legally
permissible (the Integrationist Test), we do not need to answer the intractable
question of whether those who did not control, think, or feel at the time of the
crime had the capacity to do otherwise and just did not exercise it, or instead
lacked the capacity to do so. Nor do we need to figure out whether any lack of
capacity that we think does exist is sufficiently congenital, an equally daunting
question given the fact that many people with mental illness have lucid
intervals even without medication, whereas many people who are not mentally
ill routinely misperceive risk."l 7  Morse and Hoffman's comment about
assessing the capacity to formulate mens rea applies equally in this context:
112. See supra Part I.
113. Am. Psychiatric Ass'n, Statement on the Insanity Defense, 140 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 681, 685 (1983)
(asserting that making the distinction is not possible).
114. See David Heuer Stein et al., The Clinical Significance of Command Hallucinations, 144 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 219 (1987) (describing findings suggesting that command hallucinations alone are not associated
with violent behavior); Dale E. McNiel et al., The Relationship Between Command Hallucinations and
Violence, 51 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1288 (2000) (detailing study of 103 patients and finding that "command
hallucinations [did not make) a significant contribution in determining violence risk over and above... other
predictors").
115. See Dale E. McNiel et al., The Relationship Between Aggressive Attributional Style and Violence
by Psychiatric Patients, 71 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 399, 400 (2003) (reporting literature
review and concluding that patients are most likely to behave violently when they perceive someone intends to
do them imminent harm).
116. In response to similar arguments in my earlier work, Morse and Hoffman state that I "confuse[]
causation with excuse." Morse & Hoffman, supra note 7, at 1124. But as this Article and my earlier work
make clear, see, e.g., SLOBOGIN, MINDING JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 40-41, 1 fully endorse Morse's excellent
analysis showing that causation is not excuse. See Morse, supra note 18. The point here is the converse of
the one that Morse thinks I am making: a factor cannot be excusing unless, at a minimum, it proximately
causes behavior.
117. Cf Thomas Grisso & Paul Appelbaum, The MacArthur Treatment CompetencyStudy (-WI): Abilities
ofPatients to Consent to Psychiatric and Medical Treatment, 19 L. & Hum BEHAV. 149, 169 (1995) (finding
that between 48% and 77% of patients with schizophrenia "did not perform more poorly than other patients
and nonpatients" on measures of decisional abilities).
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"Resolving questions about capacity requires a counterfactual inquiry that we
lack the clinical and scientific resources to answer."'1 18
Litton argues that the Integrationist Test also requires determining
capacities, specifically whether a person could have recognized that his claimed
perceptions were wrong." 9 But a truly integrationist approach would not be
concerned with this issue. If a non-mentally ill person claims he honestly
believed he was confronted with a situation that sounds in justification, we do
not assess his capacity to have contrary beliefs, we simply try to figure out
whether he is lying. We should follow the same analysis with people who are
mentally ill. If we decide that such people are not malingering on this score-
because, for instance, their claimed beliefs are consistent with other beliefs
they have had in the past or with other people who have their particular type of
mental illness--then they should have a defense. In contrast, even if we believe
a person's claim that he felt compelled or acted on irrational beliefs, we cannot
grant an excuse simply on those grounds, unless we either excuse all offenders,
such as people with pedophilia or psychopathy, who plausibly make such
claims or unless we conjure up a method for determining their capacity to resist
urges or discern better options.
Another version of the implementation complaint is that even if we can
ascertain an offender's real desires and beliefs at the time of the offense, the
integrationist inquiry is often too bizarre to countenance giving the desires and
beliefs dispositive weight.120 How do we assess whether Yates's belief about
her children's future would, if true, justify her act, given the fact that we do not
live in a world where children go to Hell while they are still alive? Similarly,
take the Florida case of William Cruse. 121 He delusionally believed the people
he killed were trying to turn him into a homosexual.1 22 A jury applying the
Integrationist Test would have to decide whether that belief, if true, justified the
crime.
No doubt these are unusual queries. But juries often ask themselves these
types of questions in insanity cases 123 (as do commentators who purport to be
applying other tests). 124 Additionally, there are usually analogues to such
118. Morse & Hoffman, supra note 7, at 1088.
119. Litton, supra note 57, at 487.
120. See Morse & Hoffman, supra note 7, at 1131.
121. See Cruse v. State, 588 So.2d 983, 989 (Fla. 1991).
122. Id.
123. See Finkel & Slobogin, supra note 77 (describing a studywhich suggests that laypeople left to their
own devices reach conclusions closer to those reached under the Integrationist Test rather than the other tests).
In Cruse, the jury was given an instruction that reflected the integrationist approach, and the Florida Supreme
Court approved it. Cruse, 580 So.2d at 989 ("The guilt of a person suffering from such hallucinations or
delusions is to be determined just as though the hallucinations or delusions were actual facts. If the act of the
defendant would have been lawful had the hallucinations or delusions been the actual facts, the defendant is
not guilty of the crime."). Of course, M'Naghten itself recognized an "insane delusion" test that is very
similar to the Integrationist Test. See M'Naghten's Case, (1843) 8 ENG. REP. 718, 722 (H.L.).
124. See Morse & Hoffman, supra note 7, at 1148-49. At the end of their article, Morse and Hoffman
discuss several specific cases and seem to prefer a test that asks "whether the defendant acted for a good
2009]
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situations. The jury considering the Yates case might have thought that killing
a child quickly was justifiable if necessary to prevent certain prolonged and
horrible agony (although Professor Loewy instead suggests the better analogy to
the Yates case is euthanasia, which juries normally do not excuse). 2  And
there have been quite a few instances, most notably the prosecution of the men
who killed Matthew Shepherd, where the jury has had to consider whether the
homophobia of a non-mentally ill person should excuse killing a gay person
who propositions him, 26 an issue very similar to the "bizarre" question raised
by application of the Integrationist Test to Cruse's case.
VI. CONCLUSION
Evaluating the culpability of people with mental illness using the same
framework that is applied to people who are not mentally ill avoids excusing
mentally ill people that society does not want to excuse. It also avoids excusing
people with mental illness whom juries may initially want to acquit but who
should not be acquitted because the motivations for their crimes are not
appreciably different, as a moral matter, than the motivations of offenders who
are sane. At the same time, the integrationist approach would excuse offenders
whose mistaken beliefs about reality negate mens rea or sound in justification
or duress, a group that is clearly not subjectively culpable and that is likely to
be fairly large in size despite the reduced scope of the test compared to modem
insanity formulations. 127 By integrating this latter group into the culpability
framework applied to people who are not mentally ill, the Integrationist Test is
not only more appealing normatively but is also less likely to stigmatize people
with mental illness because it ensures that such people are no longer saddled
with the double whammy associated with being called criminally insane. 28
justifying reason under positive law if the deluded reasons were true," which they admit is identical to the
justification component of the Integrationist Test. Id. at 1148 n.327; see also id. at 1147 (stating that several
of these cases may have involved irrationality but expressing doubts about recognizing an excuse in the one
case where "no plausible theory of justification or mitigation would apply even if the facts were true.");
Loewy, supra note 5, at 522 (adopting a test very similar to the Integrationist Test).
125. Loewy, supra note 5, at 522 & n.61.
126. See New Details Emerge in Matthew Shepard Murder, ABC News, Nov. 26, 2004, http://abcnews.
go.com/2020/storyid=277685.
127. See McNeil et al., supra note 115, at 401-02 (describing the relationship between paranoia and
crime).
128. Amerigo Farina et al., Role of Stigma and Set in Interpersonal Interaction, 71 J. ABNORMAL
PSYCHOL. 421, 427 (1966) (explaining that insanity is a more stigmatizing label than criminal). See also
Slobogin, supra note 2, at 58-60 (discussing the instrumental benefits of the Integration Test in more detail).
Another potential benefit of the Integrationist approach is the greater likelihood that defendants with mental
illness will support some type ofdefense on their behalf; many such defendants resist the "insanity" label and
even fire attorneys who want to assert an insanity defense. Cf Christopher Slobogin, Mental Illness andSelf-
Representation: Faretta, Godinez and Edwards, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 391 (2009).
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